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DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
FEDERAL STATUTES* 
F. ANDREW HESSICK** 
When a federal statute faces constitutional challenges, the Department of Justice 
traditionally almost always has defended the constitutionality of that statute. 
Even if attorneys in the Department think the statute is unconstitutional, they 
will defend the statute so long as a reasonable argument can be made supporting 
the statute’s constitutionality. Although one might think that the practice derives 
from ethical obligations, it does not. Instead, it rests on prudential considerations 
of maintaining a smooth relationship with Congress and ensuring that Congress 
and the courts each retain their respective roles of policymaker and adjudicator. 
When these prudential considerations no longer apply, we should expect to see 
the practice of defending statutes break down. We should expect to see the 
Executive push its own views more aggressively when litigating the 
constitutionality of federal statutes. This Essay discusses the possibility of the 
degradation of the Department of Justice’s practice of defending the 
constitutionality of statutes through the recent example of the Department’s 
aggressive stance challenging the Affordable Care Act in the Fifth Circuit, and 
it offers some thoughts on ways to provide for the defense of federal statutes in 
the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
Enacting legislation is the most important function of the United States 
government. Allocating the power to legislate and describing the process by 
which legislation is enacted are the first orders of business in the Constitution, 
and that legislation signifies the priorities and policies of the United States. To 
preserve these policies, the Department of Justice (“Department”) has adopted 
a practice of protecting federal legislation from constitutional attack.1 Typically, 
so long as a reasonable argument can be made supporting a statute’s 
constitutionality, the Department will defend the statute. This practice 
 
 *  © 2020 F. Andrew Hessick. 
 **  Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law. Thanks to Carissa Hessick and the 
participants in the North Carolina Law Review’s symposium on Legal Ethics in the Age of Trump for their 
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 1. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who 
Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 126 (2004) (“Departments of 
Justice typically defend acts of Congress that in their view are unconstitutional, as long as a reasonable 
argument can [be] made in support of the law.”); see also Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. 
L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2001). 
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resonates with the ethical obligation of lawyers to press with diligence the 
interests of clients.2 After all, the Department appears on behalf of the United 
States, and federal statutes are the laws of the United States. 
But the practice does not, in fact, rest on the ethical obligation to advance 
the interests of the client. Instead, it is not always clear that defending the 
constitutionality of a statute is in the interests of the United States. Different 
branches of government, for instance, may disagree over the constitutionality 
of a statute.3 
Instead of deriving from ethical obligations, the practice of defending the 
constitutionality of statutes rests largely on prudential considerations. Although 
the Department is part of the executive branch and accordingly owes allegiance 
to the President, it has defended statutes to preserve Congress’s role as 
policymaker and the judiciary’s role as adjudicator of the constitutionality of 
laws.4 
But if prudential reasons provide the basis for the practice of defending 
statutes, we should expect to see the practice break down when those prudential 
considerations no longer apply. If the executive branch is no longer concerned 
with maintaining a smooth relationship with Congress, or preserving 
Congress’s role as policymaker, or protecting the role of the court as adjudicator 
of constitutionality, it will more aggressively push its own views when litigating 
the constitutionality of federal statutes. 
The Department’s position in the recent challenge to the Affordable Care 
Act may be an example of this phenomenon.5 In that challenge, the Department 
argues not only that the individual mandate to buy insurance is unconstitutional 
but also that the rest of the Act must be struck down, despite not raising 
constitutional questions itself, because it is not severable from the individual 
mandate.6 It is hard to find other instances of the Department making such an 
aggressive attack on the constitutionality of a federal act. This aggressive stance 
may be ascribed in part to the increased polarization of political parties and the 
breakdown in relations between the Executive and Congress. 
This Essay considers the future of defending federal statutes. Part I 
describes the Department’s practice of defending the constitutionality of federal 
statutes. Part II notes some exceptions to the practice, and it explains that those 
exceptions highlight that the Department first and foremost represents the 
 
 2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A lawyer shall act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”). 
 3. See generally Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government 
Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991) (discussing the phenomenon of divergent interests 
within the United States government). 
 4. See Johnsen, supra note 1, at 126. 
 5. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 369 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. 
Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020). 
 6. See Brief for the Federal Defendants at 49, Texas, 945 F.3d 355 (No. 19-10011). 
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interests of the Executive instead of the entire United States. Part III discusses 
how the recent challenge to the Affordable Care Act may represent a strong 
new departure from the practice of defending the constitutionality of federal 
statutes. Part IV concludes by offering some thoughts on ways to handle the 
defense of federal statutes in the future. 
I.  THE PRACTICE OF DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES 
The Department has a practice of defending federal statutes from 
constitutional attack, even when the officials of the Department believe that the 
law is unconstitutional.7 We often see this practice with the Solicitor General’s 
office, which decides whether to appeal any case that the federal government 
has lost and which represents the United States before the Supreme Court.8 
Traditionally, the Solicitor General’s office defends a federal statute from 
constitutional attack so long as a reasonable argument can be made to defend 
the constitutionality of the statute.9 
One might think that the tradition is rooted in the ethical obligation for 
attorneys to exercise diligence in representing their clients.10 After all, the 
United States is the client of the Department, and defending the 
constitutionality of a federal statute, one might think, is in the interest of the 
United States. 
But one rarely hears ethical considerations as the basis for the practice of 
defending statutes. One reason is that it is not always clear that defending the 
constitutionality of a statute is in the interests of the United States. To be sure, 
the Constitution is the highest law in the United States, and the United States 
therefore has an interest in preventing the enforcement of laws that conflict 
with the Constitution. Thus, for easy cases where a statute plainly violates the 
Constitution, the Department’s obligation would be to argue against the federal 
statute, since the interest of all branches of the United States government is to 
uphold the Constitution. Similarly, when a statute is obviously constitutional, 
the obligation is to defend the statute, since the statute embodies the policies of 
the United States. But it is not always clear whether a statute is constitutional. 
When there is room for reasonable disagreement over the meaning of the 
Constitution, it is unclear whether the ethical obligation points towards 
attacking or defending the statute. 
Confounding the problem is that the United States is not a single entity 
with well-defined interests. The United States is more a “they” than an “it.” It 
consists of three different branches of government—the Executive, legislature, 
 
 7. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 1, at 126. 
 8. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1076. 
 9. Id. at 1083 (describing the “practice of defending any Act for which reasonable arguments can 
be made”). 
 10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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and judiciary—which are then subdivided into further parts. Each of those 
different components may have different interests and objectives as well as 
different views about the meaning of the Constitution.11 The “People” also 
arguably form a fourth group making up the United States, and they likewise 
may have interests that differ from those of some or all of the branches.12 
In the face of divergent interests, the Department cannot represent all the 
interests of everyone who makes up the United States. Instead, the Department 
must choose which set of interests to press. And because it is part of the 
executive branch, the Department inevitably ends up representing the interests 
of the executive branch.13 
Nevertheless, even when the Department thinks a statute is 
unconstitutional, it will ordinarily defend that statute. If the practice of 
supporting the constitutionality of statutes that may not be constitutional does 
not rest on ethical obligations, then why does the Department have the practice 
of defending those statutes? The usual justification for the practice rests on 
prudential considerations.14 These considerations focus on the respective roles 
of each branch of government and the relationship between the Department 
and those branches.15 
Defending statutes helps to preserve a good relationship between the 
Executive and Congress. This practice avoids the accusation that the 
Department is substituting its own policy choices through constitutional 
arguments for policy choices that Congress implemented through statutes. It also 
avoids unnecessarily accusing Congress of violating the Constitution. Congress 
has an obligation to enact only laws that it perceives are consistent with the 
Constitution.16 Defending the constitutionality of a statue conveys respect for 
 
 11. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 12. Nor is defending the constitutionality of a statute always obviously in the interests of any one 
of these components of the United States. Although each branch has an interest in the enforcement of 
federal statutes, each also has an interest in the enforcement of the Constitution. That is so even for 
Congress. Congress changes with each election. Today’s Congress may view laws enacted by 
yesterday’s Congress as unconstitutional. 
 13. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 18 (1987). Even so, the Department often must handle competing interests because different 
agencies in the executive branch may have divergent interests. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1076 
(describing how “every decision [the Solicitor General] makes comes in the context of a specific 
request” from a member of the executive branch). 
 14. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1078 (highlighting pragmatic reasons for the practice in that it 
serves all three branches of government). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the 
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United 
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution 
. . . .”). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1185 (2020) 
2020] DEFENDING STATUTES 1189 
Congress’s constitutional conclusions.17 Further, arguing in support of a statute 
may be particularly important to preserving smooth relations with Congress 
when the statute was supported by individuals who are still members of 
Congress. 
Vigorously defending the constitutionality of statutes also maintains the 
Executive’s relationship with the judiciary. The longstanding view is that the 
Constitution assigns to the judiciary the task of adjudicating whether a statute 
is constitutional.18 The practice of defending the constitutionality of statutes 
ensures that the Executive does not usurp that function but instead leaves 
determinations of constitutionality to the judiciary.19 
The Department’s practice of advocating in support of federal statutes also 
potentially protects the legitimacy of the federal government. It does so in at 
least two ways. First, it supports the Department’s legitimacy because it 
constitutes a public signal that the Department is protecting the division of 
power in the Constitution by leaving policymaking to Congress and 
adjudication to the judiciary. Second, it potentially bolsters Congress’s 
legitimacy. Refusing to defend a statute sends a signal that the Department, 
which is supposed to be acting as the advocate for the United States, has 
concluded that the United States has acted unlawfully. This message may lead 
to greater social disapproval and distrust of Congress. 
To be sure, one might argue that the Department’s unwillingness to 
defend a statute may increase the legitimacy of the executive branch. After all, 
those who agree with the Executive’s position will think that the Executive is 
acting as a defender of constitutionalism. But that is likely to be so only among 
individuals who agree with the Executive’s position. Moreover, the increased 
support for the Executive comes at the cost of less support for Congress, which 
may result in a loss of legitimacy for the United States government as a whole. 
By contrast, a practice of defending statutes whenever a reasonable argument 
can be made may be less likely to harm the legitimacy of the executive branch 
 
 17. F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1447, 1462–63 (2010). Of course, Congress does not always evaluate the constitutionality of an act. See, 
e.g., Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 324 (2008) (describing the “intentional unconstitutionality” of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006). 
 18. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 19. Of course, the Department can always choose not to enforce a law that it considers to be 
unconstitutional. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 913 
(1990); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 573, 587 (2008) (“[T]he President and executive agencies will refuse to follow or enforce a statute 
if they believe that it violates the Constitution.”). When the Department does so, it operates only in 
the executive sphere by choosing how and when to enforce the law. But when a case has been brought, 
the Department assumes the role of an advocate before the courts to assist the court in exercising its 
judicial power. 
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because the Department is not pressing its views but is merely acting in the role 
of advocate. 
II.  REFUSALS TO DEFEND FEDERAL STATUTES 
Because it is based on prudential instead of ethical considerations, the 
practice of defending the constitutionality of federal statutes is not absolute. 
The Department has declined to defend statutes—and has even attacked 
statutes—when other considerations outweigh the prudential reasons for 
defending them. In those situations, even when there are reasonable arguments 
to support the constitutionality of the statute, the Department has refused to 
argue that a challenged statute is constitutional. 
One circumstance in which other considerations outweigh those 
prudential reasons for defending a statute occurs when the President makes 
clear his view that the statute is unconstitutional.20 For example, in United States 
v. Windsor,21 the Department declined to defend the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as between a man and a 
woman,22 because the President determined the law to be unconstitutional.23 
Sometimes, the Department may even file a brief against a statute based on the 
President’s conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional. For example, in 
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,24 presidential opposition led the Department to file 
a brief against the constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting the FCC from 
discarding regulatory preferences for minority-owned stations.25 
There is nothing legally objectionable about this practice. The President 
has an obligation to uphold the Constitution, and nothing in the Constitution 
suggests that Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution trumps the 
President’s. Throughout history, presidents have regularly and independently 
assessed the constitutionality of statutes.26 A President who believes a statute is 
unconstitutional accordingly may argue against its constitutionality. Of course, 
 
 20. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1083 (noting that the Department may not defend a statute when 
“it is manifest that the President has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional”). 
 21. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 22. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2018)), invalidated by Windsor, 570 U.S. at 756; see also Windsor, 570 U.S. at 752–53. 
 23. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement of Attorney General 
on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act 
[https://perma.cc/B3ME-6ATX] (declining to defend the Act because the “President has . . . 
concluded that [the Act] . . . is . . . unconstitutional”).  
 24. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 25. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1083. 
 26. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 906–11 (documenting instances of presidential interpretation of 
the Constitution); see, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Presidential Defiance and the Courts, 12 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 67 (2018) (recounting instances of presidential disagreement with judicial determinations 
of constitutionality). 
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prudential considerations similar to those underlying the Department’s practice 
of defending the constitutionality of statutes may support a practice of the 
President presuming a statute to be constitutional unless it is clearly 
unconstitutional.27 But there are reasons that support independent 
constitutional evaluation by the President28—if nothing else, it provides an 
additional check against the enforcement of unconstitutional statutes. 
If the President determines a statute to be unconstitutional, it makes sense 
for Department attorneys to obey the President’s wishes in these circumstances. 
The Department is part of the executive branch, and the President is the head 
of that branch. But, at the same time, these decisions not to defend the 
constitutionality of statutes despite the availability of reasonable arguments 
show that the Department represents the interests of the Executive instead of 
the interests of Congress or some other part of the United States. 
Another circumstance in which the Department has declined to defend a 
statute is when the statute bears on the distribution of power between the 
Executive and other branches of government.29 In those situations, the 
Department ordinarily represents the President’s interests, pressing arguments 
against statutes that cabin his power.30 Consider the recent brief filed by the 
United States challenging the constitutionality of 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3), which 
prohibits the President from removing the Director of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau except for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.”31 Certainly, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,32 which upheld the 
constitutionality of statutes placing conditions on the removal of heads of 
independent agencies,33 provides a reasonable basis for defending the 
constitutionality of the statute because the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau is an independent agency. Nevertheless, the brief filed by the 
Department argues that the statute is unconstitutional because it unduly 
constrains the President’s removal power.34 This practice of the Department—
pressing arguments that favor the President instead of the other branches—
reflects the conclusion that it is more important for the Department to protect 
the presidency than to defend the other branches of the United States. 
 
 27. See Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
199, 200 (1994) (“The President should presume that enactments are constitutional. There will be some 
occasions, however, when a statute appears to conflict with the Constitution. In such cases, the 
President can and should exercise his independent judgment to determine whether the statute is 
constitutional.”). 
 28. Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 927–29 (listing benefits of presidential review). 
 29. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1084. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Brief for the Respondent at 3, 7, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 19-7 
(U.S. Sept. 17, 2019) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018)).  
 32. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 33. Id. at 629–30. 
 34. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 31, at 7. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1185 (2020) 
1192 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
Even when the Department declines to defend a statute on the ground 
that there is no reasonable argument to support the act, the decision reflects the 
preferences of the Executive. For almost any statute, there is a reasonable 
argument to support its constitutionality. For example, in Dickerson v. United 
States,35 the Solicitor General refused to defend a federal statute that did not 
require federal officers to provide Miranda warnings before interrogating 
individuals in custody.36 The reason, according to then–Solicitor General 
Waxman, was that no reasonable argument could be made that was consistent 
with Miranda.37 But the office could have launched reasonable arguments 
against the constitutionality of Miranda itself.38 After all, neither the Fifth 
Amendment, which is the basis for Miranda, nor any other part of the 
Constitution prescribes the warnings that officers must give under Miranda. 
The office opted not to do so based on stare decisis.39 This decision reflected 
the preferences of the administration. Stare decisis is not absolute, and the 
Department has on many occasions argued for the overruling of constitutional 
decisions.40 If President Trump instead of President Clinton held office when 
Dickerson was litigated, the Department might have argued that Miranda should 
be overturned. 
III.  THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE CHALLENGES TO 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
Typically, when the Department has declined to defend the 
constitutionality of a statute, there have been powerful reasons to doubt the 
statute’s constitutionality.41 In such a situation, the Department opts not to 
make merely plausible arguments in favor of the statute in the face of those 
other reasons. 
The recent challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act42 
is a departure from that typical practice. The Act has several different parts. 
 
 35. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 36. Id. at 432; see also Waxman, supra note 1, at 1087. 
 37. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1087–88. 
 38. See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 445–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing against the 
constitutionality of Miranda). Seth Waxman acknowledged that arguments could have been made 
against Miranda. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1088 (stating that a balance of considerations led him to 
decide not to challenge Miranda). 
 39. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1087–88. 
 40. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1997) (recounting an argument of the 
Department to overturn Establishment Clause decisions). 
 41. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1077–78, 1083–85 (providing examples of when the Department 
refuses to defend a statute, due to either the President’s determination that the statute is 
unconstitutional or because defending the statute would mean asking the Supreme Court to overrule 
its own precedent).  
 42. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2018) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of USC titles 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42).  
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One part, called the individual mandate, requires individuals to purchase 
insurance.43 Other portions dictate how insurance operates. These include 
provisions requiring insurers to cover preexisting conditions, placing various 
caps on coverage limits, and imposing insurance obligations on employers.44 
Another portion relates to the expansion of Medicaid.45 
Many conservatives opposed the Affordable Care Act from the outset.46 
The chief complaint was that the individual mandate unconstitutionally 
required individuals to buy health insurance.47 In National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius,48 the Court upheld the individual mandate based 
on the taxing power.49 Individuals who did not purchase insurance would face a 
tax fine.50 The Court said this was functionally a tax: buy insurance and get 
lower taxes; don’t buy insurance and pay higher taxes.51 
After the GOP secured both houses of Congress and the presidency in the 
2016 election, Congress enacted legislation reducing the tax penalty for failing 
to comply with the individual mandate to zero dollars.52 That led to the next 
lawsuit challenging the Affordable Care Act.53 That suit argues that, because 
failing to buy insurance has no tax consequence, the individual mandate is no 
longer an exercise of the tax power and, accordingly, is unconstitutional.54 From 
here, the plaintiffs make a much bigger claim. They argue that, if the mandate 
is unconstitutional, the entire Act must fall. According to the plaintiffs, the 
individual mandate is not severable from the rest of the Act.55  
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and struck down the entire 
Affordable Care Act.56 Although it defended the Act in the district court, the 
Department under the Trump administration switched sides in the Fifth 
Circuit, arguing that the entire Act must be struck down.57 The administration’s 
 
 43. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2018). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (2018) (preexisting conditions); id. § 300gg (coverage rate 
limitations); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018) (employer shared responsibility). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2018).  
 46. See Gregory M. Lipper, The Contraceptive-Coverage Cases and Politicized Free-Exercise Lawsuits, 
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1331, 1333–34 (“Well before Congress enacted [the Affordable Care Act] in 2010, 
conservatives opposed it—quite viscerally.”). 
 47. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is 
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 582 (2010). 
 48. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 49. Id. at 570. 
 50. Id. at 562–63. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c) (2018)).  
 53. Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 54. See id. at 591. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 619. 
 57. See Brief for the Federal Defendants, supra note 6, at 36–49.  
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position was remarkable: it did not simply opt against making a reasonable 
argument supporting the Affordable Care Act, which would have been 
consistent with the typical practice when the Department declines to defend a 
statute. Instead, the Department made an argument at the other end of the 
spectrum, pressing a position that is itself verging on unreasonable. In other 
words, instead of reaching out to defend the constitutionality of a statute, the 
Department opted to reach out to attack the constitutionality of a statute. 
The Department’s position was dubious for two reasons. First, whether a 
provision is severable depends on the intent of Congress.58 A provision is 
severable if Congress meant for the rest of the law to stand if that provision 
were to be struck down.59 Thus, the Department’s argument that the mandate 
is not severable means that Congress intended the rest of the Act to fall if the 
mandate were struck down. That is highly unlikely. By reducing the penalty to 
zero dollars, Congress made the mandate an empty requirement. There is no 
consequence for disregarding it, so whether it is constitutional is an academic 
question. Striking it down would not absolve anyone of a penalty that they 
would otherwise have to pay. At the same time, when Congress reduced the 
mandate penalty to zero, it did not address the other provisions of the Act. It 
left them untouched. Congress therefore abolished the mandate while not 
overturning the other portions of the Act. 
There are two likely explanations for this decision. First, either Congress 
deliberately preserved the other provisions of the Act, or second, it did not have 
the votes to remove those provisions. In either case, it is hard to say that 
Congress intended the whole law to fall by reducing the mandate to zero dollars. 
It would mean that, instead of overturning the Affordable Care Act by enacting 
legislation striking the Act from the books, Congress sought to overturn the Act 
by leaving it in place and tinkering with a single provision. 
Second, and even more remarkable, the Department did not limit its 
argument to the provision that raises the constitutional problem: the individual 
mandate. Instead, by claiming the provisions are inseverable, the Department 
argued that all the provisions—including provisions that do not raise 
constitutional problems—should be struck down. It is hard to think of another 
time the Department made such a concerted effort to knock down a statutory 
scheme that did not raise constitutional problems. 
The Fifth Circuit ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs and the 
Department that, after the reduction of the tax penalty, the individual mandate 
was no longer a valid exercise of the taxing power.60 But the court punted on 
 
 58. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006). 
 59. Id. (stating that the inquiry is whether Congress would “have preferred what is left of its 
statute to no statute at all”). 
 60. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 390 (5th Cir. 2019)), cert. granted sub nom. California v. 
Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020).  
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the severability question. It vacated the district court’s order on the ground that 
the district court was not sufficiently careful in assessing severability, and it 
remanded with orders that the district court reassess severability “employ[ing] 
a finer-toothed comb.”61 This determination leaves the Department with the 
opportunity to continue to pursue its severability claim in the district court.  
How to explain the intensity and scope of the Department’s attack on the 
Affordable Care Act? One possible explanation is that the usual reasons for 
defending a statute no longer apply. Just as we should expect the Department 
to decline to defend a statute when other countervailing considerations 
outweigh the prudential reasons for defending a statute, we should also expect 
the Department to refuse to defend a statute when the prudential reasons 
simply no longer apply. For example, if one of the major reasons for defending 
a statute with which the Executive disagrees is to preserve a smooth relationship 
with Congress, we should expect to see less willingness to defend a statute when 
there is no need to protect that relationship—if, for example, Congress and the 
Executive already have a dysfunctional relationship, and the President is not 
particularly interested in mending that relationship. 
In addition, if the Executive is not interested in preserving a relationship 
with Congress, we should expect to see the Department increase its willingness 
to attack federal statutes. It may no longer choose to do so when there are 
reasonable arguments, instead pressing views that more generally align with the 
philosophy of the President. The Department’s attack on the Affordable Care 
Act may be a product of these changing dynamics. It is hardly a secret that 
President Trump does not aspire to placate those in Congress who have views 
that differ from his.62 
Although the Department’s attack on the Affordable Care Act stands out 
because it is so aggressive, it may become the norm. Increasingly polarized 
politics suggests that the Executive and Congress often will not share the same 
interests, and the increased acrimony between the Executive and Congress 
decreases the likelihood that the Department will take pains to represent the 
interests of Congress. 
At the same time, courts have become the forum for resolving policy 
disagreements.63 People now routinely turn to the courts to fight vanguard 
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actions on legislation that they cannot get overturned in Congress. The 
Executive itself may not be in the practice of filing lawsuits directly challenging 
federal statutes, but it has supported those who have challenged federal 
legislation, as in the challenge to the Affordable Care Act. And it may be only 
a matter of time before the Executive regularly launches court actions against 
federal statutes.64 
IV.  DEFENDING STATUTES IN THE FUTURE 
What to do about this situation? One possibility is simply to stay this new 
course. The Department will continue to defend the constitutionality of most 
statutes, but it will aggressively attack those statutes with which it disagrees. 
Among the various downsides of this approach is that it could exacerbate 
political divides and escalate tensions with Congress. It also tends to politicize 
the courts to the extent that it seems the Executive is employing the courts to 
do its bidding against Congress. 
Of course, there are reasons to support stronger executive attacks on 
statutes. For example, one of the themes of the Constitution is to limit federal 
law. To that end, the Constitution establishes various structural obstacles to 
legislation, such as bicameralism and presentment.65 Refusing to defend 
legislation pushes in that direction. But those advantages come at a heavy cost. 
To be sure, matters may reverse course. Over time, political tensions may 
abate, and the Department may take less aggressive stances against federal 
statutes. But that is hardly guaranteed. No doubt, the level of political tension 
may be higher today than many people in the past would have predicted. In the 
future, it is entirely possible that the Department will be less defensive of, and 
more aggressive toward, statutes that do not align with the views of the 
President. 
A second option is to prohibit the Department from arguing against the 
constitutionality of a federal statute at all. If a suit challenges the 
constitutionality of a federal law, the Department can defend the statute and 
otherwise participate in the suit. But it cannot make any arguments against the 
constitutionality of the law. 
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This situation is not ideal because the function of the Department is to 
enforce the law of the land, and the Constitution is the highest law of the land. 
One would therefore think that the Department has some obligation to argue 
against statutes that conflict with the Constitution. It would also likely result 
in congressional encroachments on executive power. The President will be 
unable to protect his domain by challenging statutes that encroach on the 
executive power—statutes such as those limiting his pardoning power or 
constraining his power to remove high-level executive officials. Indeed, 
Congress may even feel emboldened to enact legislation in deliberate efforts to 
curtail executive power. To be sure, private litigants who are harmed through 
statutory schemes that limit presidential powers may challenge those statutes. 
But they may not be in the best position to offer the strongest arguments against 
those statutes because their interest may not necessarily align precisely with 
those of the President.  
A third possibility is to establish an office whose job is to defend the 
constitutionality of statutes. Whenever a case raises a constitutional challenge 
to a federal statute, this office would have the opportunity to defend the statute. 
One might argue that creating an office is unnecessary when the Department 
defends a statute and that the attorney should participate only when the 
Department opts not to defend a statute. In some sense, we already have this 
system. Although the Department has the primary role of defending statutes, it 
has refused to defend some statutes. In those cases, the Supreme Court has 
appointed counsel to represent Congress to defend the constitutionality of the 
statute.66 Moreover, on at least one occasion, such as in the case Buckley v. 
Valeo,67 the Department itself took the position of defending a statute even 
while attacking it by filing two separate briefs regarding the constitutionality of 
the statute.68 At issue in that case was whether statutory limits on campaign 
contributions and expenditures violated the First Amendment.69 The Attorney 
General and Federal Election Commission filed a brief defending the 
constitutionality of the statute.70 The Solicitor General filed another brief on 
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behalf of the United States taking a much more aggressive stance on the 
constitutionality of the statute.71 
This approach, using the already-established Department to sometimes 
defend and sometimes challenge statutes, is satisfactory for many cases, but not 
all. It is possible that, because of political pressures, the Department may defend 
a statute but not raise the best arguments to do so. That risk goes up if a separate 
congressional attorney is not permitted when the Department defends a federal 
statute. As a result, the Department may half-heartedly defend a statute 
precisely to prevent the separate attorney from appearing to present a stronger 
argument. 
Moreover, both of these approaches—appointing an amicus to defend a 
statute and dividing the Department to defend and attack a statute—are ad hoc 
solutions. They might not be observed in the future. When the Department 
opts not to defend a law, the court might not appoint an amicus, and the 
Department might opt not to file separate briefs. An office committed to 
defending statutes avoids this problem. 
It would also result in an institution that has more expertise relating to 
and strategic vision for defending statutes that the Department does not 
defend—such as statutes limiting presidential power. Right now, the 
Department regularly defends statutes that arguably infringe on the Fourth 
Amendment rights of individuals.72 Moreover, the Department has often 
defended statutes by picking cases carefully over time, choosing the order in 
which to make arguments to the courts so that it can eventually establish 
precedent that supports a particular position. But the Department does not play 
a similar role in defending the constitutionality of statutes limiting the power 
of the President. Nor does any other office. Because of the ad hoc way in which 
those statutes are defended, there is no institutional role of defending statutes 
limiting presidential power. 
CONCLUSION 
The Department of Justice theoretically represents the entire United 
States, but in practice, it represents the interests of the Executive. That reality 
is unproblematic when the interests of the Executive align with the interests of 
the other branches. But when interests diverge, there is the possibility for 
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conflict, leading the Department to adopt practices such as the tradition of 
defending federal statutes from constitutional attack. 
But those practices may be at risk with increased political polarization and 
antagonism between branches. The Department may have greater incentives to 
push the Executive’s agenda over Congress’s agenda. It may be high time to 
reconsider how the interests of the United States are represented in the courts.   
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